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PANEL II: ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
TRADEMARK DILUTION, SEARCH COSTS, AND
NAKED LICENSING
DanielKlerman*
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion in
Victor's Little Secret' held that plaintiffs in dilution cases must prove
"actual dilution," which most courts and commentators interpret as
requiring proof of "actual harm." 2 The opinion said relatively little,
however, about the nature of dilutive harm or how it is to be proved. This
Article argues that Victor's Little Secret should spur litigants, experts,
judges, and academics to think more deeply about the harms dilution may
cause. In particular, it argues (a) that bluffing should only be considered
harmful when it increases consumer search costs, (b) that the rule against
"naked licensing" should be relaxed to encourage beneficial but potentially
dilutive licensing, and (c) that free riding should not be considered
actionable.
Blurring occurs when a single trademark denotes products made by
different firms. It will be argued, however, that this phenomenon in and of
itself is not harmful. Blurring is only harmful when it interferes with

* Professor of Law and History, USC Law School, University Park MC-0071, Los Angeles,
CA 90089-0071, dklerman@law.usc.edu, www.klerman.com. Law Clerk for Justice John
Paul Stevens, October Term 1993. The author thanks Clarisa Long, Jonathan Lee, Tom Lee,
Mark Lemley, Douglas Lichtman, Maureen Morrin, Richard Posner, Jennifer Urban, Jerry
Varthielil, and participants in the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens Conference for comments,
criticism, and assistance.
1. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. (Victor's Little Secret), 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("[I]njunctive relief is available... if... there is actual harm to the trademark
holder, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc.... ");Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (interpreting Victor's
Little Secret as "requiring evidence of actual harm"); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777, 790 n.42,
826 (2004) (interpreting Victor's Little Secret as "requiring actual harm"); David J.
Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider
Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 Hastings L.J. 117, 166 (2004) ("The United
States Supreme Court has made matters worse by ruling that dilution requires proof of actual
harm."); Meredith Blaise Switzer, Annual Survey of Caselaw: Intellectual Property, 26 U.
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 933, 933 (2004) ("The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit
and held that a trademark dilution plaintiff must show actual harm ....
").
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consumers' ability to remember information about products and brands and
thus increases search costs.
Many commentators opposed the creation of the dilution cause of action,
because they thought it would forbid socially beneficial uses of trademarks
by noncompeting firms. The Coase Theorem, however, suggests that, if
transaction costs are low, such beneficial uses will still occur, because the
trademark owner and noncompeting user will negotiate a licensing
agreement. The "naked licensing" rule, however, has long forbidden
licensing without quality supervision by the trademark owner.3 This
doctrine increases the costs of licensing and thus impedes potentially
beneficial noncompeting uses. While the rule may have some justification
as applied to competitive or related uses, where there is a danger of
consumer confusion, there is no comparable justification for application of
the doctrine to noncompetitive, unrelated uses.
Some commentators have suggested that free riding is the essence of
dilution, either in theory or in practice. 4 The diluting user is taking
advantage of the original, famous mark's goodwill without consent or
compensation, and, they argue, this free riding should be actionable
dilution. Nevertheless, if the second user is not in any way harming the
senior user 5-increasing
search costs, tarnishing the senior user's
reputation, or causing some other injury-the second use is socially
beneficial and should be allowed.
Part I provides some brief background on trademark dilution and Victor's
Little Secret. Part II analyzes blurring. Part III discusses how the naked
licensing doctrine impedes beneficial licensing transactions. Parts IV and V
analyze the tarnishment and free riding theories of dilution.
I. BACKGROUND

Trademarks can be violated in two different ways: by infringement and
by dilution. Trademark infringement, which is the older cause of action, is
the use of another's trademark which causes confusion, usually consumer
confusion. Thus, if a jeweler unaffiliated with the original Tiffany & Co.
opens a store and calls it "Tiffany's," consumers are likely to believe that
the store is affiliated with the famous Tiffany brand. As a result, the
unaffiliated Tiffany's store infringes the Tiffany & Co. trademark. The
3. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 18:42,
18:48 (2005); Rudolph J. Kuss, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed. How Courts
Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This

Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law, 9
Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 361 (2005); Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-Letter Word:
Debunking the Myth of the "Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing, 82
Trademark Rep. 531 (1992).
4. See Franklyn, supra note 2.
5. Of course, the free rider could be seen as "harming" the trademark owner by
depriving the owner of potential licensing revenue. The harms referred to here are the harms
caused by consumer confusion, blurring, and tamishment, not the mere reduction in
licensing revenue.
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social harm inherent in infringement is relatively clear. Because it benefits
from the good reputation of Tiffany & Co., the unaffiliated Tiffany's has
little incentive to invest in quality. Consumers who buy at the unaffiliated
store are therefore unlikely to receive goods of the quality they expect.
More subtly, even Tiffany & Co. will have less incentive to maintain
quality, because if consumers cannot distinguish between original and
unaffiliated Tiffany stores, but eventually realize that the quality they
receive is not always as high as they expected, they will be less willing to
pay a high price even for genuine Tiffany products.
In the early twentieth century, courts often held that infringement could
only occur when the plaintiffs and defendant's products competed in the
same market. 6 This restriction was justified by the fact that the same
trademark is often used on noncompeting products without causing any
consumer confusion. For example, few consumers believe United Airlines
and United Van Lines are the same company. Nevertheless, since
companies sometimes expand their product lines, consumers could be
confused in situations where there is currently no competition, but where
such competition might plausibly occur in the future. For example, even
though there is currently no Mercedes pick-up truck, if a firm unaffiliated
with Mercedes produced a pick-up truck embossed with the Mercedes name
and hood ornament, many consumers would likely be confused into
thinking that the truck was produced by the famous German automaker. On
the other hand, it is implausible to think that Mercedes would start
producing milk. As a result, if someone unaffiliated with Mercedes started
marketing milk under the Mercedes name, there would be no infringement,
because (at least according to the courts), no consumer would be confused
into thinking that the famous German automaker produced or sponsored the
milk. As a result, modem courts require that goods be "related," although
7
not necessarily competing, for there to be trademark infringement.
Dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of.
. (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 8 Although the
definition of dilution alludes to the outdated requirement of competition, it
is universally understood that dilution can occur even where the goods are
unrelated. Dilution is usually thought to occur in two ways: blurring and
tamishment. Some commentators believe dilution may occur when there is
free riding on the good will of a famous trademark, even if there is no
confusion, blurring, or tarnishment.9
6. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:2.
7. Id. § 24:5. This, at least, is the black-letter law. It is difficult to find modem cases
where courts have found the products so unrelated to preclude confusion. When products
appear unrelated, courts may turn to the concept of sponsorship confusion. Id. § 24:7.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
9. See Franklyn, supra note 2. Dilution law is sometimes used to justify restrictions on
knockoffs where, because of the context of purchase (e.g., low-priced street vendors), there
is no consumer confusion. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic
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Tarishment is the use of a trademark in a way which creates negative

associations, usually illegality or immorality. For example, a poster with
the words "Enjoy Cocaine" in Coca-Cola's distinctive white-on-red cursive
0
could tarnish the Coca-Cola trademark by associating it with illicit drugs.'
Blurring is the use of a mark on unrelated goods in ways that do not
tarnish the original mark, but which weaken the link between the mark and
the product originally associated with the mark. A classic example is a
restaurant called "Tiffany's." Most courts would hold that there would be
no infringement in such a case, because the famous jeweler is unlikely to
open a restaurant, and thus consumers would not be confused into thinking
that the famous jeweler owned, sponsored, or otherwise stood behind the
restaurant.Il Nevertheless, for those aware of the restaurant, the Tiffany's
mark would no longer denote only the jeweler, but also the restaurant.
Other examples of blurring include Buick aspirin and DuPont shoes.12
A third theory of dilution relies solely on the idea of free riding.
Suppose, for example, that the Tiffany's restaurant did not in fact tarnish or
blur the Tiffany's mark-the restaurant was of very high quality, and, even
after repeatedly seeing advertisements for Tiffany's restaurant, consumers
continued to associate the Tiffany mark exclusively (or at least
overwhelmingly) with the jeweler. Even so, one might argue that the
restaurant should not be able to use the Tiffany name, because it is free
riding on the jewelry store's reputation. No doubt the restaurant adopted
the name "Tiffany's" because of the positive associations that the jewelry
store had created. The jewelry store created those associations through
investments in quality products, quality service, and advertising. The
restaurant, so it is argued, should not be able to take advantage of those
investments without the jeweler's consent. 13

Structure of Intellectual Property Law 208-09 (2003); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. (forthcoming June 2006) (manuscript at 27-29). Nevertheless, knockoffs can be
controlled through traditional trademark infringement law, so recourse to dilution is
unnecessary. The trademark infringement statute refers to confusion, but does not specify
that that confusion must be by consumers. Some courts, therefore, find infringement when
third parties are confused. As a result, knockoffs will not be discussed here. The author
discusses them in a related, unpublished article. Daniel Klerman, The Expressive Function of
Trademarks (Feb. 3, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?,
54 Emory L.J. 461 (2005).
10. It should be noted that, in dicta, Justice Stevens's opinion in Victor's Little Secret
questioned whether the federal statute actually forbade tarnishment. 537 U.S. 418, 432
(2003); see also Layne T. Smith, Comment, Tarnishment and the FTDA: Lessening the
Capacity to Identify and Distinguish, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 825. Nevertheless, lower courts
continue to treat tarnishment as a valid cause of action under the federal antidilution statute.
11. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("There is little
danger that the consuming public will think it's dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry
store if it patronizes this restaurant."); McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:68. But see Tiffany &
Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964) (finding trademark
infringement as well as dilution by Tiffany's restaurant and lounge).
12. Victor's Little Secret, 537 U.S. at 431; McCarthy, supra note 3, § 24:68.
13. See Franklyn, supra note 2.
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Although some states adopted antidilution laws in the mid-twentieth
century, there was no federal antidilution law until 1995. The circuits soon
split on whether the federal statute requires "actual harm" or whether
"likelihood of dilution" is sufficient. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Victor's Little Secret to resolve that split. Justice Stevens's opinion
relied primarily on the text of the statute.
The federal trademark
infringement statue refers to "likelihood of confusion," and many state
antidilution statutes refer to the "likelihood of dilution." In contrast, the
federal antidilution statute does not refer to "likelihood of dilution" or
employ similar probabilistic terms, but forbids only "dilution." As a result,
the Court held that proof of "actual dilution" was required. The Court,
however, rejected the idea that "the consequences of dilution, such as an
actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved."'1 4 Instead, the Court
stated that consumer surveys could provide "direct evidence of dilution,"
and that unspecified "circumstantial evidence" could be sufficient,
especially where the senior and junior marks were identical. 15 In the three
years since the decision was handed down, courts and commentators have
lamented the fact that the Court was not more specific in identifying what
evidence would be sufficient to prove dilution.16
Although most courts and commentators interpret the decision as
requiring "actual harm," this is not absolutely clear. The opinion does say
that the Court took the case17 in order to resolve the circuit split over whether
"actual harm" is required. On the other hand, the opinion uses the phrase
"actual harm" only when describing the decisions of lower courts.' 8 In its
own analysis, the Court uses the phrase "actual dilution." 19 The Court
probably thought that these two phrases were identical. Nevertheless, as the
discussion below will reveal, there may be "actual dilution" without any
"actual harm."
In response to Victor's Little Secret, the House of Representatives passed
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, which, among other changes,
would eliminate the "actual dilution" requirement, by allowing relief when
an unauthorized use "is likely to cause dilution." 20 As of the writing of this
Article, the Senate has taken no action on the bill.
II. BLURRING
The harm caused by trademark dilution is elusive.
Courts,
commentators, and legislative committees use vague and unhelpful terms,
14. Victor's Little Secret, 537 U.S. at 433.

15. Id. at 434.
16. Thomas R. Lee, Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. Rev 859, 863 (2004) ("[Victor's
Little Secret] raises at least as many questions as it answers. Its core holding is inherently
unstable ....).
17. Victor's Little Secret, 537 U.S. at 428.
18. Id. at427,428.
19. Id. at 433, 434.
20. H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
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such as reduction in a mark's "selling power" or "advertising value," or the
"whittling away" of a mark's distinctiveness. 2 1 In my opinion, the most
convincing analysis of dilution's harm can be found in William Landes and
Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law
(2003). Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, even this analysis is
incomplete.
With regard to blurring, Landes and Posner argue,
Suppose elite brand names, such as "Tiffany" and "Rolls Royce" were
appropriated only by producers of equally fine products. Nevertheless,
the distinctiveness of the marks as identifiers of the products sold by the
Tiffany and Rolls Royce companies would be reduced. More mental time
and effort-the "imagination cost" to which we referred in Chapter 622would be required to associate the name with a particular product. The
result would be an increase in consumer search
costs. This is the
"blurring" effect of which the dilution cases speak. 23
There is some empirical evidence that blurring increases consumers'
"mental time and effort." In a study performed by Maureen Morrin and
Jacob Jacoby, some participants were shown ads for hypothetical diluting
products, such as Heineken popcorn, while others (the control group) were
shown unrelated ads. 24 Both groups were then presented with a number of
word pairs (e.g., Heineken/beer, Heineken/hotel) and asked whether the
words were a "match. '2 5 Persons exposed to advertisements for diluting
products were more likely to make mistakes in matching brands to products
and product attributes. 2 6 For example, survey participants exposed to ads
for Heineken popcorn agreed that Heineken was a brand of beer 82.8% of
the time, whereas those who had not been exposed to the popcorn ads
agreed 92.1% of the time.2 7 In addition, even when consumers correctly
matched brands with products and attributes, they took longer to do so. For
example, persons exposed to diluting ads who correctly identified Heineken
21. Victor's Little Secret, 537 U.S. at 427-28, 430, 432; Frank 1.Schechter, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection,40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927).
22. The only discussions I found in Chapter 6 of "imagination cost" were the following:
A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a compact,
memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The economy is
less when, because the trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must
think for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.
Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 161 (citation omitted). "[T]he availability heuristic may
be consistent with rationality once one acknowledges that imaginative reconstruction
requires more 'effort' (that is, cost) than immediate perception; in other words, once thinking
is understood to be a costly activity." Id.at 161 n.31.
23. Id.at 207.
24. Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, TrademarkDilution: Empirical Measuresfor an
Elusive Concept, 19 J.Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 265, 268-69 (2000). It should be noted that
the authors did not conceive of this study as measuring the effect of dilution on search costs.
Rather, their study was designed to test an "[a]ssociative network theory" of "information
stored in long-term memory." See id, at 267.
25. Id. at 268-69.
26. Id.at 269.
27. Id.
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as a brand of beer took, on average, 770 milliseconds
to do so, versus 645
28
seconds for those not exposed to the diluting ads.
While this study is suggestive, it does not establish that blurring causes
harm. First, although the study found an effect for some brands (such as
Heineken), it failed to find an effect on other brands (such as Hyatt). 29 This
suggests that blurring may be a much more complex phenomenon and that
some brands may be resistant to harm. Later research by Morrin and others,
for example, suggests that the more famous the brand, the less subject it is
30
to blurring.
Second, although the study found some increase in "mental time," the
increase is not economically significant. Those exposed to diluting
advertising took only 125 milliseconds longer than others to link brand to
product or attribute. This is barely a tenth of a second. Even for someone
earning $250 per hour, the increase in search costs would be less than a
3
penny. 1
Third, the study did not distinguish between four different mental tasksremembering the product(s) associated with a brand if prompted with the
brand, remembering relevant brands if prompted with the product category,
remembering product attributes if prompted by a brand, and remembering
brands having particular attributes if prompted by attributes. For example,
dilution might interfere with the ability of consumers to remember that
Heineken is a beer if prompted by a picture of the Heineken trademark, but
consumers might still be able to remember that Heineken is a brand of beer,
if they were asked to list brands of beer. The latter is much more relevant
to consumer behavior and to the identification of the harm caused by
blurring. If a consumer is thinking about buying beer, it is helpful if the
consumer can remember several relevant brands so she can choose among
them. It is hard to think of situations where consumer search is aided by the
ability to remember the product category associated with a brand.
Consumers just do not confront trademarks in the abstract very often, and,
when they do, context usually makes the product category obvious. 32 If
28. Id. The results discussed here are for the control group which was shown unrelated
ads, rather than ads for the diluted or original products.
29. The study also found an effect for a third brand, Godiva, but the experiment involved
tamishment rather than blurring. Id.; see infra Part IV.
30. Maureen Morrin, Jonathan Lee & Greg Allenby, Determinants of Trademark
Dilution, 33 J. Consumer Res. (forthcoming Sept. 2006).
31. ($250 * 0.125 seconds) /(60 minutes * 60 seconds/minute) = 0.87 cents.
32. One place where a consumer might encounter a brand in the abstract is telephone
white pages, although even here entries are likely to mention category--"Tiffany & Co.
Jewelers" rather than simply "Tiffany & Co." Another context where brand names are used
in the abstract is Internet searching. Nevertheless, the fact that search engines are likely to
list the famous brand's website first eliminates any harm here. People sometimes mention
brands in the abstract in conversation, but the relevant category is usually apparent from
context. When a person complains about United's cramped seating, it is clear that he is
talking about the airline, not the moving service. Perhaps antidilution laws could be justified
as reducing the need for advertisers to remind consumers the relevant product category. In
Tom Lee's view, antidilution laws would thus reduce "maintenance costs," Lee, supra note
16, at 898. It is an interesting empirical question whether antidilution laws have led to such
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someone says, "Tiffany's has a good selection of diamonds," it would be
obvious that Tiffany & Co. jewelers is intended, not the restaurant. When
consumers are searching for a product, the relevant product category is
usually obvious or assumed.
Although the ability to remember brands in a particular product category
may sometimes be helpful in identifying which products one might want to
buy, it is often unnecessary. If the consumer goes to a grocery or liquor
store to buy beer, all the relevant brands are likely to be shelved next to one
another, so the ability to remember relevant brands may not be that
important. In this situation, the ability to remember the attributes of each
brand-bitterness, smoothness, heaviness, whether they have additives,
which brands friends prefer, etc.-is probably more important for consumer
search. For this task, the relevant survey question is whether, having seen
the branded product, consumers can remember its attributes. On the other
hand, consumers sometimes choose first the characteristics they want, then
the brand, and then the store likely to stock the brand. In such situations,
the relevant survey questions would be (1) whether, having been prompted
by the product category (beer), the consumer can identify the brand
(Heineken), and (2) whether having identified the brand, she can recall its
attributes (smoothness, bitterness, etc.). Without information on these
distinct questions, it is difficult to know whether blurring causes any
significant harm, or to identify when those harms occur.
It is also possible that blurring increases search costs in a more
straightforward way. While blurring and infringement are usually seen as
distinct, it is possible that laws against blurring help prevent the sort of
consumer confusion which is at the heart of infringement. To prove
infringement, the plaintiff must show confusion or likelihood of confusion
among a significant portion of the population. If surveys suggest that less
than ten percent of people are likely to be confused, courts usually find no
infringement. 33 One reason courts fail to find infringement in such
circumstances is that some proportion of survey respondents are likely to be
confused no matter what the question, so ten percent or less may indicate no
34
increase in confusion attributable to the defendant's product.
Nevertheless, such survey results may also suggest some avoidable
confusion.
In addition, some consumers may think that similar or identical marks
used even on noncompeting, completely unrelated products indicate that the
products are produced by the same entity. In a world in which the Virgin
cost reductions, a phenomenon which perhaps could be measured by counting the number of
advertisements which include no mention (aural or visual) of the product itself or the
relevant category. My suspicion is that advertisements for all but most famous brands must
mention the product or product category no matter what the law is, because they cannot
assume that consumers have already made the connection between brand and product
category. That is, the key problem faced by advertisers is not multiple associations with the
brand, but none at all.
33. McCarthy, supra note 3, §§ 32:188, 32:189.
34. Id. § 32:187.
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Group operates airlines and produces music, this confusion is not entirely
irrational. As applied by the courts, infringement is presumed to be
impossible where the products are unrelated. 35 That presumption may be
false. The blurring cause of action may therefore reduce search costs by
preventing the consumer confusion which courts mistakenly assume use of
similar marks on unrelated products does not produce.
Although the forgoing discussion suggests that blurring may increase
search costs-either by impairing memory about product attributes or by
causing consumer confusion as to product origin-the increase in search
costs may be quite small. On the other hand, the costs of the blurring cause
of action may be substantial. The existence of anti-blurring legislation
leads to lawsuits, the need to investigate whether a new trademark might
blur an existing one, 36 and the need to negotiate licenses for what otherwise
would be free. If blurring increases search costs only a little, the costs of
the blurring cause of action may outweigh its benefits.
III. THE COASE THEOREM AND NAKED LICENSING
Of course, even if blurring causes some harm (an increase in search
costs), it is also possible that blurring confers benefits which exceed that
harm. For example, even if the existence of a Tiffany's restaurant increases
the cost of searching for jewelry, the use of the Tiffany mark on a restaurant
might have even larger benefits. As Landes and Posner point out in their
37 If
discussion of tarnishment, favorable associations are a social benefit.
calling a restaurant "Tiffany's" causes consumers to have a more
pleasurable dining experience, that is a social benefit. Of course, according
to the Coase Theorem, if there are no transaction costs and the social
benefits exceed the costs, laws against blurring would not block the opening
of a Tiffany's restaurant. The restaurant would simply negotiate a license
to use the Tiffany mark. Of course, there are transaction costs. In addition
to the ordinary transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing licenses,
trademark law imposes an additional cost-supervision by the trademark
owner of the quality of the blurring use. The "naked licensing" doctrine
forbids licensing unless the trademark owner polices the licensee. 38 Failure
to supervise can result in cancellation of the mark or can give infringers a
defense. 39 The fear of forfeiture would thus make trademark owners
reluctant to license potentially blurring uses, or would induce them to
demand higher licensing fees in order to offset the cost of monitoring and
the danger of cancellation of the mark.
The naked licensing doctrine is justified as consumer protection. If the
trademark owner does not supervise licensees, consumers may end up
35. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) ("If the goods are
totally unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is unlikely.").
36. Clarisa Long calls these "avoidance costs." Long, supra note 9, at 31.
37. Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 207.
38. See supra note 3.
39. Kuss, supra note 3, at 363.
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purchasing goods of lower quality than they expected. Although this
rationale can be (and has been) much criticized, it at least has surface
plausibility where the licensee is in the same market, or at least a market
which is sufficiently related that consumers might be confused. 40 Blurring,
however, is only relevant when there is little danger of confusion. In such
circumstances, the doctrine has no justification. It was developed before
dilution became a cause of action, and it has remained on the books,
unexamined. Now that there is legislation against dilution, the doctrine
causes real harm by preventing socially beneficial licensing agreements.
Nevertheless, even if the naked licensing doctrine were abolished, I
suspect that there would be relatively little licensing. The benefits to the
licensee are likely to be small, so potential licensees would be willing to
pay relatively little. On the other hand, brand managers would probably
demand relatively high prices to compensate for five possible disadvantages
to licensing: (1) the low levels of consumer confusion, discussed above,
that use of the mark on an unrelated product could cause, 4 1 (2) the
possibility that the unrelated product might, in the future, have a tarnishing
effect, perhaps because of a safety problem or management scandal, (3)
uncoordinated associations that use of the mark on an unrelated product
could cause, (4) fear that the license would be interpreted as endorsement,
and (5) the need to inform consumers, through advertising or other means,
that the licensee is not otherwise affiliated, so as to prevent or minimize
harms (1) through (4).42 Concerns (4) and (5) require some further
explanation.
Even if the licensed product were of high quality, it could interfere with
the associations that the owners of the mark had created for the original
product. For example, if the trademark owner had created a sporty image
for its product, but the licensed product had a refined, restful image, the
licensed product could interfere with consumers' image of the original
product, even if the licensed product were of high quality.
Trademark owners might also fear that consumers would interpret the
license as an endorsement of the licensed product, and thus use the licensed
product to make quality inferences about the original. That is, licensing
might create confusion as to source. Even if consumers had no direct
knowledge of the license, if unauthorized blurring uses were forbidden,
consumers would rationally infer a license from the unchallenged existence
and marketing of the product.

40. See supra note 3.
41. See supratext accompanying notes 33-35.
42. Tom Lee and David Welkowitz call this last consideration "maintenance costs."
Lee, supra note 16, at 898; David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining TrademarkDilution,44 Vand.
L. Rev. 531, 543 (1991).
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TARNISHMENT

With regard to tarnishment, Landes and Posner observe that it is common
for people to be willing to pay a premium for items with positive
associations. For example, ordinary objects formerly owned by Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis have sold for astronomical prices. Similarly, people
avoid negative associations-few people today name their children
"Adolf." Because of this psychological phenomenon, Landes and Posner
suggest that tarnishment would "impose a cost."' 43 Consumers would be
less willing to buy a product after it has been tarnished, or willing to buy it
only at a lower price. Nevertheless, while this explains why trademark
owners fear tarnishment, it does not explain why tarnishment is a social
harm. One might, for example, believe that tarnishment simply causes
consumers to purchase equally good (or superior) items produced by a
competitor. If so, the loss to the owner of the tarnished trademark might be
exactly offset by the gains to the competitor.
Further reflection, however, suggests that, in most cases, there are likely
to be four kinds of genuine social losses. First, those who purchased the
product before its tarnishment are likely to be harmed, as they will derive
less pleasure from it now that it has negative associations. For example,
someone who purchased Godiva chocolate and then saw advertisements for
Dogiva dog biscuits is likely to derive much less enjoyment from eating the
chocolate, because the chocolate will now evoke association with dog food.
In such cases, tarnishment may ruin the tarnished product.
Second, even if tarnishment causes consumers to purchase substitutes of
similar quality, there is some loss of consumer surplus. For example,
suppose after seeing advertisements for Dogiva dog biscuits, a consumer
who previously would have purchased Godiva chocolate purchases See's
chocolate instead. The fact that the consumer previously would have
purchased Godiva implies that, prior to the tarnishment, she would have
expected to receive more consumer surplus from purchasing Godiva
chocolate than See's chocolate. Because of the tarnishment, she now
purchases a less preferred chocolate and receives less consumer surplus.
Third, the activity which causes tarnishment, typically advertising, is
often socially costly, so even if the harm and benefit which flow from
tarnishment have no net effect, once the cost of advertising is included in
the calculus, tarnishment is a net loss to society.
Fourth, the owner of the mark which is tarnished may respond by trying
to restore its brand's positive associations, and those efforts (again,
typically advertising) are socially costly.
None of these reasons are valid in all cases. The first-harm to those
who purchased the product before its dilution-applies primarily to durable
goods. If the good or service has already been consumed before the
tarnishment occurs, there is unlikely to be any harm, except perhaps if the
43. Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 207.
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tamishment causes unpleasant (or less pleasant) memories of the product or
service. The second reason-consumer substitution to a less preferred
product-applies whenever the consumer was not previously indifferent
between the tarnished product and its substitute, but in many cases, this
harm is likely to be very small. In competitive markets, substitutes (See's
chocolate and Godiva chocolate) are likely to be quite close in quality. The
third reason-the socially costly nature of the tarnishing activity itself, e.g.,
advertising-does not apply when the tarnishing activity has some
independent social value, as is the case when the tarnishing activity is the
production of a separate product. For example, an "Enjoy Cocaine" poster
may have independent value, as evidenced by the fact that people are
willing to pay for it. In addition, even if the tarnishment was caused by
advertising, the third reason is valid only if the tarnishing entity would
otherwise have engaged in less advertising or advertising of a more
informative kind.
The fourth harm-the social cost of responsive
advertising-is of course inapposite if the trademark owner decides that no
response is the best response. In spite of these limitations, the four reasons
presented above provide some plausibility to the idea that tarnishment
causes actual harm.
Tarnishment may also increase search costs. The study discussed above
found that tarnishment, like blurring, led consumers to make more errors in
matching brands to products and product attributes, and increased the time
it took to make correct matches. 44 As with the prior discussion of blurring,
relaxation of the naked licensing doctrine would help ensure that the
tarnishment cause of action blocked only uses which cause net social losses.
As noted above, there will be some circumstances in which there are social
benefits to the tarnishing use. One way of dealing with such cases is to
create doctrines, such as a parody defense, which immunize whole
categories of potentially tarnishing uses. Another strategy is to rely on
private negotiation. If the benefits of the tarnishing use outweigh the
harms, the tarnishing user may be able to negotiate a license. As noted
above, however, the naked licensing doctrine impedes such negotiations
without providing any corresponding benefit, and should be relaxed. Of
course, even if the naked licensing prohibition is repealed, there is no
guarantee that all beneficial tarnishing uses will be licensed. Many uses,
such as parody, provide consumers benefits which exceed the price paid.
Unless the tarnishing user is able to perfectly price discriminate, it will not
capture the full benefits of the use. As a result, it may be unable to pay a
licensing fee sufficient to compensate the trademark owner for the harm,
even if there is a net social benefit.
V. FREE RIDING

A third theory of dilution relies solely on the idea of free riding.
Suppose, for example, that the Tiffany's restaurant did not in fact blur or
.44.

Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 24, at 269-70 (Godiva and Dogiva experiment).
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tarnish the Tiffany's mark-the restaurant is of very high quality, and, even
after repeatedly seeing advertisements for Tiffany's restaurant or even
eating there, consumers had no difficulty remembering the attributes of
Tiffany jewelry or that that Tiffany is a brand of jewelry. Even so, one
might argue that the restaurant should not be able to use the Tiffany name,
because it would be free riding on the jewelry store's reputation. No doubt
the restaurant adopted the name "Tiffany's" because of the positive
associations that the jewelry store had created. The jewelry store created
those associations through investments in quality products, quality service,
and advertising. It is unfair, so it is argued, for the restaurant to4 5 take
advantage of those investments without consent and/or compensation.
The problem with this argument is that, if the junior user benefits (as
evidenced from its desire to use the mark), but there is really no harm (no
confusion, no blurring, no tamishment), then it is socially desirable for the
junior user to use the mark. In fact, allowing the use is Pareto superiorthe junior user and its customers benefit, and no one is harmed. Giving the
senior user the right to enjoin the use either blocks beneficial transactions
or, if the parties negotiate a license, adds transaction costs. Because of the
policy against naked licensing,4 6 the most likely outcome would be to block
a majority of transactions. Even if licenses could be negotiated, the
associated transaction costs would only be justified if they had some
socially beneficial ex ante effect.
Landes and Posner suggest that preventing free riding could increase
incentives to invest in the creation of prestigious names.
"If the
appropriation of the mark without the permission of [the famous trademark
owner] were nevertheless forbidden, the benefits of its investment in
creating a famous name would be more completely internalized and the
amount of investing in creating prestigious names would rise." 4 7 This
argument requires some unpacking. One must compare three states of the
world:
(1) Unauthorized free riding is allowed and occurs.
(2) Unauthorized free riding is forbidden and no licensing occurs.
(3) Unauthorized free riding is forbidden, but licensing occurs.
The incentive to invest in the creation of prestigious names is the same in
states (1) and (2). Although free riding occurs in state (1), that does not
mean there is less incentive to invest than in (2). By hypothesis, the
trademark owner is not harmed by the unlicensed use. That is, the market
for the trademark owner's product is unaffected by the unlicensed use. The
unlicensed user benefits from the trademark owner's investment, but that
benefit in no way reduces the owner's incentive to invest.

45. Franklyn, supra note 2. For a critique of free-riding arguments more generally, see
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031

(2005).
46. See supra note 3.
47. Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 207-08.
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On the other hand, the incentive to invest in the creation of prestigious
names is higher in state (3). In this situation, investment benefits the
trademark owner in two ways: sales of the trademark owner's product and
licensing revenue. Since the creator of a famous trademark stands to gain
more, the incentive to invest is larger.
Whether there will actually be an increase in incentives to create famous
trademarks will thus depend on the extent of licensing. If, as conjectured
above, trademark owners are unlikely to license noncompeting, unrelated
uses, then forbidding unauthorized free riding will not increase incentives to
create famous marks. All that will happen is that we will move from state
of the world (1)-lots of unauthorized free riding-to state of the world
(2)-no authorized or unauthorized free riding. On the other hand, if there
were some licensing-state of the world (3)-forbidding free riding could
increase investment. Even here, however, Landes and Posner argue that
competition among famous trademark owners would drive licensing
revenue to zero, so even state of the world (3) would not result in any
increased incentive to invest.4 8 Thus, the only way forbidding free riding
could increase investment is if no more than a small number of owners of
famous marks were willing to license. With only a small number of famous
marks available for license, competition might not drive licensing revenue
to zero and mandating licensing for otherwise free-riding uses could
generate some revenue. On the other hand, since only a small fraction of
famous trademark owners would be taking advantage of this opportunity,
the overall ex ante incentive effects would be small.
In addition, even if there were some incentive effects, it is unclear
whether there is any need for increased incentive to create famous names.
The profits from selling prestigious products seem sufficient, and it is
unclear what social benefit there would be from additional incentives. In
fact, to the extent that prestigious products are used to signal their
consumers' wealth, it might be socially desirable to reduce investment in
famous brands. Displays of wealth, like arms races, may benefit no one.
To the extent that people are concerned primarily about their wealth relative
to others, displays of wealth are a zero-sum game. One person's spending
advances her own status at the expense of someone else's. As a result,
overall welfare might be higher if everyone were prevented from spending
to display wealth. 4 9 Of course, refusing to recognize free riding as a form
or theory of dilution would not prevent most displays of wealth.
Nevertheless, to the extent that doing so would reduce investment in
48. Id. at 208. Landes and Posner also argue that forbidding free riding could help
trademark owners inefficiently prevent their marks from becoming generic. Id. This seems
unlikely. Non-confusing uses by noncompetitors are not the kinds of uses that are likely to
cause genericness. A restaurant called Tiffany's is not likely to make consumers think that
"Tiffany's" is generic for jewelry or jewelry store.
49. Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for
Status (1985); Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1381
(2005); Klerman, supra note 9.
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prestigious marks, it might reduce the social loss that such displays cause.
In any event, consideration of wealth signaling casts doubt on the argument
that increased investment in prestigious names would be socially valuable.
It is interesting to note that the case which led the Fourth Circuit to the
"actual harm" requirement, and thus created the circuit split which
prompted Supreme Court review of Victor's Little Secret, seems to have
involved pure free riding. The plaintiff in that case presented survey
evidence that consumers seeing Utah's tourism slogan, "greatest snow on
earth" thought of the Ringling Brothers' Circus and its slogan, "the greatest
show on earth." Justice Stevens analyzed the case as follows:
We do agree, however, with that court's conclusion that, at least where
the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally
associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to
establish actionable dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such
mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous
mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for
dilution under the FTDA. For even though Utah drivers may be reminded
of the circus when they see a license plate referring to the "greatest snow
on earth," it by no means follows that they will associate "the greatest
show on earth" with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or
exclusively with the circus. "Blurring" is not a necessary 50consequence of
mental association. (Nor, for that matter, is "tamishing.")
The Ringling Brothers' survey established free riding. Consumers who
saw the defendant's slogan, "greatest snow on earth," thought of the
Ringling Brothers' Circus and its slogan. Utah, in its attempt to promote
tourism, was attempting to link its snow with the favorable associations
generated by the famous circus. Nevertheless, there was no evidence of
blurring or tamishment. The Fourth Circuit therefore held that there was no
dilution, and Justice Stevens's opinion endorsed that finding. Thus, where
there is only free riding, both Justice Stevens's opinion, and the analysis
provided here, suggest that there is no actionable harm.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens's opinion in Victor's Little Secret highlights the need to
identify the actual harm caused by dilution. That is not an easy task. There
is some evidence that blurring increases search costs, although more work
needs to be done. In addition, even if blurring and other forms of dilution
cause actual harm, without relaxation of the naked licensing doctrine,
antidilution law may cause even more harm, by preventing socially
beneficial licensing deals.

50. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. (Victor's Little Secret), 537 U.S. 418, 433-34
(2003).
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